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10.  The macroeconomics of the credit 
crisis: in search of externalities for 
macro prudential supervision 
 
 Frank A.G. den Butter  
___________________________________________________ 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The major cause of the credit crisis of 2007-2010 is insufficient knowledge of 
banking supervisors of the macro-economic mechanisms that governed the 
amplification of the relatively small initial shock of a decrease in housing 
prices in the US, to the financial markets. In other words, it is insufficient 
knowledge of the externalities that caused the market failure of the financial 
markets, which resulted in a failure of macro-prudential supervision to 
prevent the amplification and propagation of the initial shock. It appears that 
banking supervision, in addition to strong voices and lobby for deregulation 
in the heydays of the banking profession, was mainly focussing on 
supervision of individual banks, and was neglecting he macro-economics of 
the financial sector. 
This paper focuses on these externalities which played a crucial role in the 
amplification of the initial shock. The argument is that the main (or even 
only) aim of regulation, and hence of banking supervision, is to internalize 
externalities. So, in order to become a trustworthy egulator again, banking 
supervisors should analyse which externalities were the cause of the systemic 
crisis. The problem is that we still do not know about the precise character of 
the externalities.  
In this era of easy communication much has been said and written on the 
causes and consequences of the crisis and on possible olutions. A plethora of 
opinions is the result. Scientists from other disciplines are eager to blame 
economists for all what went wrong. In their eyes economics has disproved 
as serious science because economists were unable to pr vent this tragedy, or 
at least to foresee it. These opinions are often followed by broad reflections 
on how the economic system in the world or society should be arranged in a 
completely different manner. But economists themselves have also blurred 
the debate with a cacophony of opinions. 
In the search of externalities which governed the amplification 
mechanism, this paper limits itself to explaining the causes and remedies of 
the crisis by using the traditional mainstream economics based on the 
assumption of rational behaviour. This framework suffices to understand 
what we do know about the crisis, and more importantly, what we still do not 
know. From that perspective the following section describes the major 
suspects of the crisis whereas section 3 discusses a number of alleged 
misconceptions which in the debate have also been s as major causes. The 
propagation mechanisms appear to be so complicated that only a model based 
analysis can reveal their working. Section 4 surveys models that may be 
helpful in that respect. A key question in the debat  is the predictability of the 
crisis. Section 5 argues in a more general outlook on this matter that the type 
and timing of a shock which causes a cyclical downturn is unpredictable. 
Therefore policy should be concerned with the propagation mechanism.  
In case of the credit crisis it is essential to make  distinction between (i) 
the original shock (which was relatively small: a decrease in housing prices 
in the US lowering the value of subprime mortgages); (ii) propagation of the 
shock to the financial sector (causing a systemic crisis with a huge 
amplification of the initial shock); and (iii) propagation of the systemic 
banking crisis to the real economy: the great recession. Macro-prudential 
supervision should prevent a systemic crisis by internalizing as much as 
possible the externalities which contribute to the amplification. Section 6 
elaborates this aspect and concludes.  
 
 
2   MAJOR CAUSES OF THE CRISIS RELEVANT FOR THE SEARCH  
     FOR EXTERNALITIES 
 
2.1 First and Major Suspect: Innovation of Originate and Distribute 
Model: Securitization 
 
As mentioned above the main aspect to be analyzed in the search for causes 
of the crisis and the externalities that adequate supervision should internalize, 
is the fact that a relatively small initial shock was so much amplified. A 
major observation here is that in the aftermath of the shock the mutual 
entanglement of the financial sector appeared to be much stronger than that 
was assumed in quiet times. This is called ”contagion", which the World 
Bank describes as: "Contagion occurs when cross country correlations 
increase during crisis times relative to correlations during tranquil times” (see 
Gallegati et al., 2008, p.3, who refer to the Bank’s webpage on contagion of 
financial crisis). The originate and distribute model of securitization, which 
was in good times regarded as a useful financial innovation, is now 
commonly regarded as the prominent cause of the amplification of the shock 
and of enhancing contagion. Securitization is the bundling of financial assets, 
including subprime mortgages, in packages, so that they can be sold as liquid 
assets to financial institutions. This possibility to package and sell, and 
repackage and sell again has contributed much to the further entanglement in 
the financial world. It could be compared with AIDS. The securitization can 
be seen as a form of unsafe sex in a society which as become profoundly 
promiscuous leading to a global contagion of financi l institutions. That’s 
why I sometimes speak of “unsafe” assets. Following this analogy, banking 
supervision should see to it that the financial world becomes less 
promiscuous and/or uses better preservatives (condoms) 
With rising housing prices in the US the problem with the originate and 
distribute model remained hidden. The financial innovation of securitization 
was even seen as a blessing because it seemed to prom te risk diversification 
of financial institutions and it made “clumsy” long term financial assets, 
including mortgages, liquid and therefore more marketable. The 
securitization was also considered beneficial because the rising housing 
prices, which in this context can be seen as a positive shock, enhanced the 
positive second order effects of securitization for financial institutions. It 
implied that the lenders could resell their mortgages and with the money thus 
obtained could provide new mortgages. Here the seedis laid for excessive 
lending, so that in the long run this financial innovation brought 
disadvantages rather than benefits. It went really wrong when housing prices 
fell and the positive shock turned negative. The negative shock was much 
amplified while the idea was that the risk diversification would have a shock 
absorbing effect. Apparently there is an asymmetry in the external effects of 
the securitization: positive to a positive shock and negative to a negative 
shock. (see eg Gallegati et al, 2008). Thus, this innovation turned from 
blessing into a curse. 
This transfer and shifting of risks in securitization, while benefiting from a 
relatively high yield, has somewhat the character of a Ponzi game, where a 
high yield is partly paid by attracting new resources for which a high yield is 
promised. Activities of hedge funds in a way contai elements of this game, 
but also the way mortgage lenders, in the originate and distribute model, have 
benefited from the rising house prices, and hence caused a further rise of 
those prices, can be characterized as a mild version of a Ponzi game. Of 
course it is not really the Ponzi game Madoff played by using the deposits of 
new investors to provide earlier investors the promised high returns. That is 
outright fraud whereas securitization was regarded an acceptable and in good 
times even useful financial innovation.  
Anyhow, the way in which the financial innovation of securitization has 
contributed to the start-up and getting out of contr l of the crisis, shows that 
such innovations are not always beneficial for the economy. Compare the 
example of fishermen who, through an innovation, avail of better nets. 
Individually, they become more efficient, but collectively it means that the 
sea will be fished out. However, in case of good regulation which internalizes 
these externalities - in this case imposing and strict enforcement of fishing 
quota - the innovation of the better nets would have  positive impact. 
Productivity increases and the fish becomes less expensive. 
This analogy, which of course is not fully comparable to the case of 
financial innovation, shows how an innovation can reinforce negative 
externalities when there is no proper regulation of these externalities. 
Negative externalities in this context mean that the decision of an individual 
(person or firm) has an adverse impact on others which is not taken properly 
into account in that individual decision. In contrast, an adequate regulation 
could even bring about positive externalities. In that case, the innovations are 
beneficial to others. The fishermen may develop and use more sophisticated 
nets so that less undersized fish is caught which implies that there is more 
fish available in the future. The example of the fishermen and fish quota also 
shows how difficult it can be in practice to regulate properly. A group of 
independent experts is needed who are to make a credible analysis of the 
future development of aquatic resources. Even in that case political interests 
play such a great role in the determination of fishing quotas that the opinion 
of the experts is often overruled. Eventually, the fishermen themselves suffer 
from not complying with the quota. This applies equally to banks that only 
pursue their own interests and ignore the unwarranted boomerang effects of 
shifting risks away. However, repair of these types of market failure by 
means of adequate regulation may, just as proper enforcement of fishing 
quotas, result in a positive contribution to wealth creation by financial 
innovations. That is why this paper sees the financial innovation of 
securitization as a major cause of the credit crisis which could have been 
prevented by an adequate response of regulators.  
 
2.2 Second Suspect: Moral Hazard: Too Much Risk and Leverage due  
      to Prospects for a Bailout and Too Little Attention of Originator for 
      Avoiding Default of Mortgages 
 
A second suspect of causing the crisis is the moral risk which stimulates 
irresponsible behaviour in reaction to insurance, or in reaction to the 
prospects of compensation or help by the government. De Nederlandsche 
Bank (2009) argues that securitization evokes this problem of moral hazard 
because the original lender has less incentives to monitor the debtor and order 
repayment of credit. A similar problem holds in case of a system of deposit-
guarantees where depositors are less careful in their assessment of the 
reliability of the financial institution where they entrust their savings. A 
prominent example is the insolvency of the Icelandic internet savings bank 
Icesave. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) is less clear on the fact that the 
prospect of a bailout in case of failure of a financi l institution which is “too 
big to fail” enhances the asymmetry in taking risks. In fact this type of moral 
hazard can be seen as a major cause of the irresponsible behaviour of banks, 
which, with a high leverage of borrowed debt, took t o large risks, or 
otherwise underestimated their risks. The reward fo good luck in those cases 
accrued to the banks, while bad luck was passed on to society through the 
bailout. The prevention of these forms of moral hazard is a major concern in 
the design of future measures of supervision of the financial sector (see eg. 
Bullard et al., 2009). 
Although moral hazard provides an explanation for ir esponsible 
behaviour of banks (or of holders of savings) it can very well be avoided. 
Indeed, the classic situation of moral hazard occurs with insurance where the 
insured becomes less cautious with taking risks than when he or she would 
not be insured and thus would suffer a greater loss in case the risk 
materializes. Insurance companies have learned how to cope with this and 
avail of many rules and conditions to minimize moral h zard. Therefore, the 
problem of moral hazard does hinder the shock-dampening effect of risk 
diversification. In the case of the financial system, however, there is a 
staggered system of moral hazard. The expectation is that the central bank 
will intervene and keep affected banks and financial institutions alive. For 
central banks this is a dilemma as they engage with the rest of the financial 
world in a sort of "game of chicken". If the central b nks (and governments) 
concede - and in recent times they did – the expectations of the financial 
institutions is confirmed that in the event of demise they will be saved by a 
bailout. This is recognized by the central banks but the short-term profits of 
curbing the crisis are to be weighed against the long-term loss of the 
prospects for no-bailout. The loss means that the financial institutions 
become rewarded for their bad behaviour and will take more risks in future. 
The bailout obviously enhances the moral hazard of financial institutions. In 
turn, the financial institutions will be less inclined to prevent moral hazard 
with their customers and thus be less stringent with the requirements of 
providing risky loans. In that sense the reduced attention to moral hazard that 
a bailout evokes, has a self-reinforcing element. 
 
 
2.3 Third Suspect: Fallacy of Composition: Macro Behaviour ≠ Sum of  
      Micro Behaviour 
 
As mentioned above a core problem that caused the credit relates to the way 
the distribution of risks in the financial world takes place. A risk has two 
dimensions, namely (i) the probability that an event with (negative) financial 
impact occurs and (ii) the size of the (negative) effect: the damage. The 
existence of risk means that there is uncertainty. It is essential that the risk is 
properly assessed. However the claim is incorrect that the failure of the US 
mortgages increased the risks. That makes no sense, like the claim that when 
throwing an unbiased dice the probability of getting a 3 increases when one 
has thrown a 3. 
Insurance companies have a long experience in evaluating risk properly. 
They will also only increase the insurance premium when a trend increase in 
the damage amounts (over the insured amount) is detectable. Here, there is 
even an insurance paradox (see Hinloopen, 2007). It is necessary for the 
survival of the insurance company that occasionally damage occurs, When 
there would be no damages, no one would want to insure. Something similar 
applies in the financial world. When risky venture capital investments were 
not occasionally confronted with default, there would be no reason to require 
a high return on such investments. Insurance companies know well how to 
diversify risks by mutual reinsurance and by combining risks worldwide 
which are uncorrelated (see Lucas, 2002). This system is (apparently) able to 
dampen large shocks. Major disasters with much damage h ve, for the time 
being, been well absorbed by the system and have not l d to a global crisis of 
insurance. Why is not the same true with respect to the risky loans at the 
subprime mortgage market? Partly this has to do with the other character of 
the risk in the financial world. The ownership of the risk here is passed to the 
person or institution that seeks the highest possible return with, from the 
perspective of the individual investment, the smallest risk. Securitized assets, 
where risks were bundled together in packages, becam  popular in that 
respect. They were easily negotiable and could be kept off-balance by the 
financial institutions, which provided a cover-up for the risks. Especially 
hedge funds and investment banks have taken these pack ts in portfolio and 
sold them in new combined packages (resecuritization). The result is a very 













Note: The Penrose triangle is an impossible figure, an optical illusion. For the analysis 
of the credit crisis, the Penrose triangle symbolizes the "fallacy of composition": at the 
micro level of the vertices everything seems to be correct, but at the macro level the 
figure is incorrect. 
 
Figure 10.1 The Penrose triangle. 
 
Economic theory gives two fundamental reasons why such a system can 
go wrong, and why the system may amplify shocks in tead of dampen them. 
The first is the role of asymmetric information. The buyers of the packets that 
contain risky assets, have less information about the contents of packets than 
the sellers (originators). Here market activities are governed by ”bounded 
rationality” when the benefits of additional information do not outweigh the 
cost of obtaining such additional information. This information asymmetry 
can be overcome by a mutual trust between traders who buy and sell these 
complex financial products. If by some reason this trust is violated, the 
mutual trust no longer serves as a substitute for inf rmation about the nature 
of the financial products. The market collapses and the system breaks down. 
This is the mechanism which is formalized in a number of model-based 
explanations of the credit crisis (see section 4). It explains how the economy 
can move from an equilibrium of mutual trust to an equilibrium of mutual 
distrust.   
The above arguments give rise to consider the "fallacy of composition" as 
a fundamental cause of the credit crisis (see figure 10.1 and Box 10.1). This 
implies that the system as a whole operates differently than an analysis of the 
sum of the parts would suggest. In other words: a risk assessment only at the 
level of individual banks, or on the individual merits of the various 
derivatives, is inadequate at the macro level. It is he macro-view, which 
should provide insight into how the financial innovation of packing and 
selling risks has affected the resilience of the financial system. That insight is 
essential for assessing which externalities have caused the contagion of the 
system. 
 




























2.4 Fourth Suspect: Winners Curse: securitized assets have been bought   
      at too low a price by those undervaluing the risks 
 
This selling of packages of assets - including the "unsafe" subprime 
mortgages - with different risk profiles made the buyers of the packages loose 
sight on the size of the underlying risks. The packaging and selling of these 
assets can be compared to a river with water from different sources. 
Downstream one does not know anymore from what source the water 
originates. It is impossible and of no use to verify. In the start-up period of 
The "fallacy of composition" is the phenomenon that behaviour at the micro 
level that aims to increase the individual welfare, does not necessarily do so at 
the macro level, or may even destroy welfare at the macro level. The famous 
example is a football stadium where all spectators are seated. When the first 
rows of spectators stand up in order to see more, indeed it gives them a better 
view. However, the result is that now everyone has to tand up so that the entire 
stadium has the same view as before, but everyone is ow standing instead of be 
seated so that the overall "welfare" has decreased. The Dutch graphic artist 
Escher was fascinated by this fallacy of composition in the many variations on 
the Penrose triangle of his etchings (see figure 10.1). If one looks only at the 
vertices - the micro perspective – the picture seems correct , but the overall 
picture - the macro perspective - is clearly wrong.  
The fallacy of composition in the case of risk means that if all individual 
investors and financial institutions merge risks in packets to yield low-risk high-
return investments and sell it to each other, at a macro level the overall risk does 
not disappear. It is true that the diversification f risk ensures a lower risk 
premium because of lower expected volatility. However, the buffer which is 
necessary to the cover the default, remains the sam at the macro level. As the 
global financial system is a closed system, the risks that banks and speculative 
investors have sold in packages, eventually returns to them in disguise. The fact 
that the risks of these securitized assets are placed outside the balance of the 
institutions makes them less visible but does not alter this conclusion. At the 
level of individual financial institutions everything seemed all right for the 
supervisors: banks and other lenders complied with their requirements. Their 
main focus was on monitoring the vertices in the Penrose triangle and therefore 
it was not sufficiently realized that the system as a whole was not sustainable.  
the credit crisis, the packages were bought by those parties, which made the 
lowest estimates of the risks. In selling and reselling of the packages in the 
end the risks were considerably underestimated. This resembles the problem 
of the winner’s curse (Box 10.2). Note that in this interpretation of why risks 
were underestimated, and hence too high a price was paid for the assets given 
their true risk profile, it cannot be considered irrational or erroneous 
behaviour. It is simply the outcome of the risk model when uncertainty about 
the magnitude of the risk exists, even in case of differences in preferences 
regarding risk. This uncertainty about the risks, coupled with the fact that the 
“unsafe” assets were repackaged and resold, constitute  another major 
mechanisms which caused the financial system to break down. However, in 
the analysis of the credit crisis the heterogeneity in the assessment of the 
risks, and therefore the problem of the winner’s curse has so far obtained 
little attention. 
 



















This section discussed some major causes of the credit crisis and the 
breakdown of the financial system. These causes may provide a clue on what 
externalities future regulation of the financial markets should try to 
internalize. However, in the policy and economic debat s of the credit crisis 
much more causes have been put forward. It seems that knowledge on 
externalities, and hence on policies that may prevent future systemic failures, 
are blurred by misconception about the causes of the crisis. The following 
section discusses these misconceptions. 
As noted in the main text, a key problem in risk asses ment, especially in the case 
of packages of securitized assets, is the heterogeneity of the assessment. Asset 
holders do not all make similar assessments, especially when there is incomplete 
and blurred information about the risks. A similar problem exists in the auction 
for a construction contract where the contract is awarded to the contractor who 
bids the lowest price. It is most probable that this "winner" has underestimated 
the costs and that this will eventually lead to a loss - or, still worse, that the 
“winner” is unable to fulfill the contract and will go bankrupt. This is called "the 
winners curse". Nobel Prize winner Vickrey has even formulated a system - the 
Vickrey auction - to avoid this curse, namely that the contract be awarded to the 
bidder with the lowest price at the price of the second lowest bidder. More 
generally, the problem occurs in any system characte ized by an auction market 
where items are sold to the highest bidder. In the case of cascades of sales of 
risks, which is a characteristic of the markets forc llateralized debts and 
securitized assets the risks are systematically underestimated. It is evident that in 
such markets the winner’s curse has a reinforcing effect and can contribute to the 




3   MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 
 
3.1 High Bonuses 
 
A first misconception is that high bonuses are the major culprits of the crisis 
and that by restricting bonuses, either through an appeal on morality or 
through taxation, future systemic crises can be avoided. The reasoning here is 
that not the bonuses but the way the financial sector has made profits poses 
the real problem.  
In itself there is nothing wrong with businesses making profits and 
rewarding those responsible for the profits with bonuses. There is little 
protest against the high rewards that clubs and tournament organizers give to 
athletes who deliver an exceptional performance and hence contribute to full 
stadiums and collect major television and advertising revenues. Many enjoy 
these performances which contribute directly to social welfare. The same is 
true for top artists. Here the relationship between p rformance and social 
welfare is direct and clear. The relationship betwen the performance of a 
director or board of directors of a large industrial enterprise, the profits of 
that enterprise and their contribution to welfare is already somewhat more 
complicated. The question is whether the profits can be attributed to a good 
business strategy, to inventive and skilled employees or to external factors 
such as a favourable climate or cyclical situation. But when the profits of 
such an enterprise contribute to social welfare andre not obtained at the 
expense of the welfare of others is, there is no reason for politicians or 
regulators to oppose bonuses to be paid to successful ntrepreneurs.  
This also applies to profits of financial institutions in case there exists a 
similar link between performance and direct contribution to welfare creation. 
It should be remembered that the traditional function of these institutions is to 
intermediate between individuals and companies who need money to invest, 
and individuals and companies who have saved money that they want to be 
invested. The intermediation is concerned about the alignment of the amounts 
of money, the time profiles, the rate of returns and the risks. This traditional 
business of financial institutions obtains its profits from the skills and 
knowledge to realize these forms of intermediation at the lowest possible 
costs. The institutions that manage best, make the highest profits while also 
contributing to social welfare. In this situation there is nothing wrong with 
payment of bonuses in order to reward specific and scarce skills.  
The problem is that the financial sector in recent decades has drifted 
further and further away from the traditional business. Financial innovations 
– eg. securitization - and institutional changes – eg. merging of commercial 
banks and insurance companies - make it unclear what the real source of the 
profits of financial institutions is. Investment banks and private investment 
funds undertook various activities to profit from mergers and take-overs. 
Often the intention of these activities was not to create value contributing to 
social welfare. Profitability in the short term is obtained at the expense of 
profits in the long term. The recent case of the “hlp” that Goldman Sachs 
offered the Greek government to hide huge government d ficits, is a good 
example. It appears that the only purpose of these sp cific financial 
innovations is to shift profits from the future to the present, leaving the future 
generation with an obligation to be productive and inventive, but where the 
rewards have already been given away. A sign on the wall is that the rates of 
returns, and especially the growth in size of the financial institutions in the 
period before the credit crisis have, for many years, been significantly higher 
than in the real economy (see eg. Knot and Van Hengel, figure 8.5, this 
volume). It is unlikely that this is exclusively the result of a continuous 
increase in efficiency bringing down the costs of financial intermediation.  
The result is that it is no longer clear to what extent financial institutions 
really contribute to welfare, or whether they earn their profits at the expense 
of the welfare of others. In the latter case the financial institutions do not 
contribute to an increase of the cake of welfare, but only to a redistribution to 
their advantage. It does not seem a redistribution which brings more income 
equality and is therefore warranted from the perspectiv  of social welfare. On 
the contrary. The most prominent example of this redistribution of welfare is 
the too high risks banks have taken in selling and buying securitized assets. 
The banks assumed that a bailout would prevent them o go bankrupt in case 
of bad luck whereas in case of good luck the profits from speculation were 
theirs. And that is exactly what happened. That is why, in the previous 
section, the moral hazard of the bailout is seen as one of the main culprits of 
the crisis. It implies that losses were passed to society, while the profits were 
taken by the banks themselves. My favourite one-linr which I found on 
internet and which really illustrates this argument is that there was 
“privatization of profits and socialization of losses”. In addition, financial 
products were developed which made convenient use of tax deductions and 
which brought small profits to the customers but high profits to the banks. 
This is also detrimental to society because it lowers tax revenues. 
Obviously, these ways of obtaining profits by financial institutions can 
regarded as market failure, and even as rent seeking - the creaming-off of the 
welfare of others. The role of government and regulators is to repair this 
market failure and to prevent rent seeking. In other words, to ensure that no 
profits at the expense of others or at the expense of society as a whole be 
taken. In that sense the same applies for the financ al institutions as for a 
chemical factory which is to keep the environmental clean and should not be 
allowed to make high profits through excessive pollution. The focus on 
bonuses is as if the government allows a chemical plant to make huge profits 
by tolerating polluting activities on the proviso tha  no high salaries are paid 
to the directors and staff. The difference between the government regulation 
of ordinary businesses and the financial world is that in the latter case, it is 
much less transparent which is the true contribution o social welfare and to 
what extent the profits are based on stolen wealth of others. For the design of 
adequate rules for macro-prudential regulation it is essential to unravel the 
different sources of profits. However, the financial institutions are keen not to 
be transparent in this respect and try to throw sand in the eyes of the 
supervisors about the true strategies for obtaining profits. 
All in all this shows again that for a good monitoring and regulation of the 
financial world a clear understanding should be obtained about the market 
failures that are caused by financial innovations and the way strategic 
decisions are made in the financial system. Transparency is needed so that it 
becomes visible where the financial world actually contributes to welfare, 
and where there is only redistribution and rent seeking. In case of such 
adequate regulation profits will not be achieved at the expense of others. In 
that case there is no need to oppose to bonuses, because there will be no 
asymmetries in the reward system which yield incentiv s for taking too high 
risks.  
 
3.2 Low Interest Rates 
 
The policy of low interest rates that was especially conducted by the Fed 
under chairman Greenspan, is seen by some as a major cause of the credit 
crisis, as it urged banks (and also pension funds) to be more keen on 
additional returns to their assets. There are arguments to consider this a 
misconception as well. Firstly there should be some nuance with respect to 
the fact that interest rates were low: it is true for nominal interest rates but not 
so much with respect to real interest rates as compared to periods when there 
was a high inflation. More importantly, the financial system should be set up 
in such a way that it is resistant to the way cyclical macroeconomic policy is 
conducted. To use a somewhat sorrowful analogy: during the last large 
earthquake in China many schoolchildren died, not so much because of the 
shock of the earthquake – which of course is true – but because there had 
been insufficient supervision on constructing schools which were shockproof.   
 
3.3 Large Deficits and Surpluses in the World 
 
The huge differences between high spending countries- especially the US 
with large consumer debts and negative savings rates – and countries with 
huge surpluses is also regarded as a cause of the crisis. It is true that it has 
resulted in large imbalances of balances of payments in he world. The rich 
Arab oil producers and China have enormous surpluses and money to invest, 
whereas the US and some European countries run large deficits and are to 
borrow money. Obviously exchange rates are no longer sufficiently flexible 
to make the balances of payment return to equilibrium. These large savings’ 
surpluses and deficits evoked huge world wide flows of capital where 
investors tried to obtain the highest rates of return. As yet, this does not 
explain why it is to be regarded as a cause of the crisis. As indicated above, it 
is the very task of banks and other world wide operating financial 
institutions, to intermediate between capital owners and investors in need for 
capital. This intermediation should not pose any problem in a global financial 
system with perfectly working markets and no market failures. In that ideal 
world large savings surpluses should even be beneficial or the international 
financial markets as it requires much intermediation activities.  
 
3.4 Rating Agencies 
 
A similar argument holds for the rating agencies which are often considered 
accountable for the crisis. However, with adequate regulation, banks will not 
be seduced into taking excessive risks due to an overly positive risk 
assessment. In that case those rating agents would be selected by the banks, 
which provide the best and unbiased ratings. But it is true that we (still) do 
not live in such a perfect world and that it would be better for regulators to 




Short sighted shareholders are also be blamed for causing the crisis. It is true 
that the prominent focus of the Anglo-Saxon model on shareholders value 
may have contributed to irresponsible behaviour of the management of 
banks, but in case there would have been no prospects for a bailout, 
shareholders would have lost all of their money in case of bankruptcy. 
Moreover one may question why, in case of adequate regulation, 
shareholders of financial institutions would react differently than 
shareholders of companies in the real economic sector. In that sector there is 
no complaint that shareholders are responsible for a crisis.  
 
3.6 Emotions (Although there has been Herding which can be seen as  
      Rational Behaviour) 
 
Another misconception is that untamed emotions and irrational behaviour 
were a major cause of the crisis. References to emotions and irrational 
behaviour do not provide an analysis which is useful for macro regulation. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable that emotions play a crucial role in a world 
where we talk about gains or losses at a magnitude of billions dollars or 
euro’s. As professional poker players should not be guided by emotions and 
even should hide their own emotions as well as possible, the same holds for 
the players on the financial markets. In both cases, the “players” are to take 
rapid decisions under conditions of information uncertainty, both about their 
own opportunities as well as about the position of others. This requires a 
refined and experienced intuition, but no emotional or irrational behaviour. 
The difference here is, again, that the decisions of players in the international 
financial markets bring about externalities, whereas that is not the case in the 
poker game.  
 
3.7 Greed, or even the Whole Capitalistic System  
 
Those who consider the crisis a prove of the bankruptcy of the capitalistic 
system, see unbridled greed as causing the crisis. Thi  too is a misconception: 
greed, or to put it more neutral, the pursuit of self-interest, enhances, 
according to mainstream economic theory, economic welfare. In the modern 
market economy, however, it is the task of the government to minimize 
undesirable greed – that is, greed that harms others. That is the main 
argument for government regulation, a regulation which in the case of 
financial markets has not properly taken place because, as mentioned before, 
there is no good analysis of the externalities which are at the root of the 
crisis.  
 
3.8 The Bubble 
 
Some see the current crisis as the bursting of a bubble, which arose because 
of buoyant lending and overconsumption, as discussed above. In this 
perspective, the last misconception is that this crisis can be identified with the 
bursting of previous bubbles. If that were the case, it should by now be 
known what the best solution is, or it would even have been possible to 
prevent the crisis. But every bubble is different. The theory of bubbles 
provides only a case description, and no causal analysis. 
 
 
4   MODELS CAN TEACH US ABOUT EXTERNALITIES 
 
In order to obtain more knowledge on the externalities hat were responsible 
for the amplification of the shock in the credit crisis and that should be 
internalized by new measures of macro-prudential supervision so as to 
prevent a next implosion of the financial system, a new type of macro models 
should be developed. Surely the traditional empirical macro-models with a 
monetary sector, such as the model of the Banca d'It lia (Fazio et al, 1970) 
and the MORKMON model (Fase, 1981, De Nederlandsche Bank, 1984, Den 
Butter, 1988), do not suffice. These models consistently explain the items on 
the balance sheets of the different economic sectors and consequently the 
money flows (flow of funds) between those balance sh ets. However, the 
mutual dependency of the banks, and hence the shifting of risk, the associated 
external effects and the extent of contagion remain out of the picture in these 
models. The new models should also improve on describing the effect of 
external shocks such as the fall in housing prices as compared to the models 
which are nowadays used in macro stress tests to simulate the effects of a 
massive withdrawal of funds from one bank. (see eg. the model in use at the 
Netherlands Bank, Van den End, 2008).  
In the economics profession a lively debate emerged on which types of 
models would be appropriate to explain the crisis. The debate was triggered 
by a question of the Queen of England when visiting he London School of 
Economics in November 2008. The question was why no o e - read no 
economist – had seen the credit crisis coming. The response of the British 
Academy to that question of Queen Elizabeth contains the following passage: 
 
“But the difficulty was seeing the risk to the system as a whole rather than to any  
specific financial instrument or loan. Risk calculations were most often confined 
to slices of financial activity, using some of the b st mathematical minds in our  
country and abroad. But they frequently lost sight of the bigger picture ". (RES  
Newsletter, Issue 147, October 2009, p. 8).  
 
This confession of the science community in the UK is at the heart of what 
has been lacking in the models that monetary authorities avail of in order to 
restrict the risks of a systemic crisis as much as possible. In the Netherlands a 
topic in the debate was that it was fully understandable that the models did 
not foresee the crisis as the dominant type of models ar  general equilibrium 
models which are by definition unable to describe and foresee major 
imbalances. However, according to Den Haan (2009) it is a big 
misunderstanding that all of modern macro models assume an equilibrium. 
By way of example Den Haan refers to a model of his own which shows that 
a shock may be large enough to cause a financial crisis f om which the 
economy can not recover without government interfernce (Den Haan, 
Ramey and Watson, 2003). This is a so-called dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model with a financial sector, where the label of equilibrium 
model is misleading because the model can describe many rigidities in the 
Keynesian tradition, so that activist government intervention may prove 
necessary.  
Gautier (2009) adds to this argumentation that the fact that most 
economists have underestimated the probability of the risk of a crisis, is not 
surprising because it is difficult to distinguish bubbles from fundamental 
developments. The mainstream models based on rational expectations and on 
the efficient market hypothesis do not suggest that people make no mistakes, 
but only that they make no systematic mistakes. From that perspective 
Gautier lists a number of economic models that were d veloped long before 
the credit crisis, but that describe more or less the mechanisms that gave rise 
to the crisis. In the present context of the crisis the model of Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) is perhaps the most relevant. These authors show how a small 
fall in property prices can have huge effects, if that property is used as 
collateral for (mortgage) loans. Their model describes a self-reinforcing 
process, which shows substantial agreement with the actual developments of 
the US housing market, which were at the root of the crisis. 
 There are also macro models that describe multiple equilibriums, which 
may explain the transition, mentioned before, from an equilibrium of mutual 
trust between traders in the financial markets to an equilibrium of mutual 
distrust. Here the theoretical analysis of Diamond (1982) uses an interesting 
metaphor. It describes a tropical island where the only activities are picking 
coconuts from the trees and laying on the beach. The in abitants of this 
island derive utility from eating the coconuts, but there is a taboo on eating 
your own coconut. Therefore you must find a trading partner that wants to 
exchange your coconuts with his or hers, so that you will not consume your 
own coconuts. In this model there is a good equilibrium where everybody 
climbs in the trees and picks coconuts for trading them, and a bad equilibrium 
where nobody is picking coconuts and there is no trade. In the bad 
equilibrium no coconuts are consumed. 
However, these existing models do not, or not explicitly describe the 
external effects which may be of use to a better design of macro-prudential 
supervision. Furthermore, the models do not explain the "fallacy of 
composition" with respect to the risk at the macro level as was worded in the 
response to the British Queen. Yet, before the crisis a number of models was 
published which did indeed include externalities which could lead to a 
breakdown of the financial system. Wagner (2009) gives an overview of 
these models. He makes a distinction between models that include 
externalities that lie outside the financial system, and models with 
externalities from inside the system that make the difficulties of individual 
banks manifest. According to Wagner this literature suggests that the 
externalities increase in size as more banks become unable to fulfil their 
obligations, or have almost reached that situation. These models all show 
how the adequate regulation could prevent market failure. In particular this 
concerns regulation by means of capital requirements.  
Gai et al. (2008) have specified and elaborated a model that, through an 
externality, can simulate a systemic crisis. This model describes the financial 
intermediation from a general equilibrium approach w ere the externality 
occurs in cases of forced sales of assets during a period of stress. This 
externality creates a self-reinforcing effect on the economy which jumps 
from an equilibrium with adequate financial intermediation to a bad 
equilibrium without financial intermediation. According to this model, 
financial innovations reduce the probability of such a systemic crisis, but 
when a crisis occurs it is fiercer than before. Today it is rather amusing is that 
a simulation with a calibrated version of the model showed that a mild 
recession may take place once every six years but adeep systemic crisis will 
occur only once in every 200 years (!). Apparently the description of the 
mechanisms in the financial system by this calibrated version of the model do 
not yet fully apply to the situation of the credit crisis. 
On the other hand the stimulating model by Gallegati et al (2008) is 
developed with the implosion of the financial system in mind. These authors, 
including Nobel laureate Stiglitz, show that securitization has led during the 
good times of rising housing prices to a strong interdependence of financial 
institutions. In the down-turn of the economic tide, when housing prices 
began to fall, this interdependence proved through contagion to result in a 
negative externality, not foreseen by the supervisos. The externality is that 
the initial shock of falling house prices, which reduced the value of the 
packages of unsafe mortgages held by banks, evoked a global distrust 
between the banks on the value of their mutual debts. The model thus shows 
why the strong interdependence of financial institutions caused an 
amplification of the initial shock rather than an absorption of the shock due to 
the risk diversification. In this way the model also provides a lesson on how a 
different and better supervision may in the future p vent such crises. The 
remedy is to stop the further entanglement of the financial markets and avoid 
contagion but permit risk diversification. Decoupling of different parts of the 
banking system and a greater diversity in the busines  form part of the 
solution. In other words, when the domino stones of the financial markets are 
set further apart, the chance that all of them fall down at the same shock 
becomes smaller. However, which specific regulatory measures are needed 
for this, and how the regulation can be effective with minimal cost, is still to 
be resolved.  
In the model of Acharya et al (2009) a negative externality arises as a 
systemic risk where the getting into trouble of one fi ancial institution has 
negative implications for other financial institutions. These authors advocate 
that when fixing the insurance premiums for deposits one should not only 
take into account the expectations of the various risks of individual 
institutions but also the expected systemic risk.  
The interesting model of Caballero and Simsek (2009) focuses on the 
mechanisms which were the actual driving forces in the credit crisis. The 
model distinguishes three externalities. Besides th network externality and 
the "fire sales" externality, which were already described in other models, 
Caballero and Simsek add a complexity externality. This externality takes 
account of the fact that the financial system has become so complex, for 
example because of cascades of sales of various type of securitized assets, so 
that the judgment of the risks gets blurred. If thebanks are risk-averse the 
increased uncertainty about the risks in the network leads to a reduction of 
welfare of the banks. The result is a negative spiral which is sizeable because 
a problem in the financial world does not only have an effect on the 
institutions which therefore also get into trouble (the network externality), 
but also on all other institutions that lose sight of he events. This provides a 
good description of how a lack of trust resulted in a rapid stop of trade in 
liquid assets between banks. Caballero and Simsek have not yet elaborated 
which measures of financial regulation their model suggests in order to avoid 
a systemic crisis, but it can be expected that a model with three externalities 
offers an extensive scope for policy measures to internalize these 
externalities. 
All in all, this survey of the macro-economic models, which aim to 
formalize the functioning of the main mechanisms which caused the credit 
crisis, shows that these models focus on specifying the externalities and 
market failures that are responsible for the sudden collapse of the financial 
system. The first models which give a somewhat realistic picture of the 
events are now leaving the drawing board. There is still a long way to go 
before fully fledged empirical models are available for policy analysis. These 
models should not only give a qualitative but also a quantitative assessment 
of the different mechanisms and externalities that created the crisis. 
 
 
5   THE NEXT RECESSION 
 
Now that the credit crisis has transmitted to the real economic sector and has 
resulted in the great recession, the question is how t is recession will evolve 
and how and when we can get out of it. Therefore it is tempting to try and 
compare this recession with previous ones. However, characteristic for 
recessions is that they all have a different cause. For that reason, Haberler has 
already in 1937, in its book Prosperity and Depression, collected for the 
League of Nations a comprehensive list of the various causes and 
mechanisms responsible for the succession of good and b d economic times 
(Haberler, 1937). The current recession, with the cr dit crisis as a prime 
cause, can thereby be allotted to the class of the pur ly monetary theories of 
the cycle. The variability of the cycle makes the economic tides hard to 
predict. As a result, it is also difficult to conduct an appropriate cyclical 
policy. When all cyclical fluctuations would be similar and lookalikes, 
economists should by now be successful in dampening these fluctuations as 




Uncertainty is the major problem for the policy response to the next cyclical 
fluctuation. Economists have learnt to deal with certain types of uncertainty. 
This is the case when economic time series data show some regular and 
recurrent patterns so that they can be described by stochastic processes. Then 
the parameters of these processes can be estimated, giv n the assumptions on 
the probability distributions of the data. Even in case probability distributions 
are unknown, there are parameter free methods to be used. And in most cases 
of risk, the odds are known. However, there are many other and more 
fundamental types of uncertainty (Van Asselt, 2000).  
The most far-reaching, and for the analysis of future events most 
troublesome type is what Wynne (1992) labels ‘ignora ce’. It is when we do 
not know what we do not know. (see also Recuerda Girela, this volume, on 
ignorance and the precautionary principle). In the Netherlands the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR) advises the government on long term 
policy issues, based on scientific information. When I was a member of that 
council we discussed possible future developments which would impose 
problems to the government and on which we were ‘ignorant’. Among 
others, space trash and nanorobots were mentioned. On second thought, 
however, it seemed that there was too little information and that is was too 
uncertain to dedicate a scientifically based study to these subjects. Moreover 
there is no complete ignorance about space trash and n orobots. 
 
5.2 Solar Storm 
 
We are also not completely ignorant about the next r cession. The periodicity 
of the cyclical movements in the past makes us presum  that after the current 
recession and following upswing, eventually a new recession will come. 
However, it is uncertain when that will happen and what the cause and nature 
of it will be. Here we know what we do not know; the cause will be another 
one than in the past. Perhaps we must revive, in a modern look, an old and 
somewhat curious economic theory on the cycle, namely Jevons’ theory on 
sunspots. It may be that within a couple of years a sol r storm hits the earth 
with the same intensity of that of 1859 (Mols, 2009). Let us suppose that it 
happens in 2012 when the Maya calendar ends. Some see that as the end of 
times or as the beginning of the new times. By the way, in its new solar cycle 
prediction of May 29th, 2009, NASA now forecasts the peak of the sunspot 
activity of ‘solar cycle 24’ for May 2013. So there may be some 
postponement of the end of times. Moreover, the activity of solar cycle 24 is 
predicted to be rather mild as compared to other periods of high solar 
activity. Yet, that may not prevent the new solar sto m to be the beginning of 
a serious recession. The top of the solar cycle in 1859 was also below 
average. Its intensity was the result of a coincidence of circumstances where 
the magnetic field of the electrified gas that took off from the sun interfered 
with the magnetic field of the earth and hence disturbed its protection. Such a 
geomagnetic storm will cause much damage to the electricity distribution as 
it will expose many transformers in the system to permanent damage. It will 
also disturb all kinds of wireless communication. In 1859, the societal impact 
of the storm was not yet large because the uses of electricity and radio 
communication were in its infancies. In 2012 or 2013 it is very different. 
Nowadays distribution networks for electricity are much interconnected so 
that the storm may cause a large scale blackout of supply. Moreover, electric 
power is modern societies’ cornerstone technology, the technology on which 
virtually all other infrastructures and services depend. So, apart from the 
electricity supply, a severe solar storm will cause an enormous collateral 
damage. In 2008 a Committee on the Societal and Economic Impacts of 
Severe Space Weather Events made, under the auspices of the National 
Research Council in the US, a scenario for a ‘severe g omagnetic storm’. The 
scenario estimates the economic and societal costs t  be $1 to $2 trillion 
during the first year alone, with recovery times of 4 to 10 years (National 
Research Council, 2008). So the overall economic and societal costs of the 
storm may exceed that of the US subprime mortgage crisis. 
 
5.3  Avoid Contagion 
 
Another candidate cause for the next recession is when the successor of the 
Mexican flue will become really dangerous and pandemic. Seemingly, 
cyclical policy is unable to prevent recessions which such different external 
causes. Indeed, recessions are inevitable just becaus  the cause of the next 
recession is unknown. Yet, we can see some similarity in the propagation 
mechanisms of the initial shocks. In the all three cases, the credit crisis, the 
solar storm and the pandemic flue, the large worldwide interdependence in 
the economic system brings about an enormous amplification of the initial 
shock. In case of the present recession it is the fast growth of the worldwide 
mutual dependence of the banking system which has the ubprime mortgage 
shock amplified towards a systemic crisis. In the pr vious section we have 
seen that this ‘contagion’ acts as an externality in case of a negative shock. 
Therefore, the deepness of the present recession is mainly the result of the 
market failure associated with that externality. So, the time has come to think 
also in a more general context about how the negative externality of 
contagion can be mitigated in the future. How can the economic system be 
rearranged so that the far-reaching impact of an inevitable external shock is 
less strong? How can we avoid that all domino stones i  the economic system 
fall at the same time without doing harm to the enormous welfare gains that 
globalization has brought us? That knowledge will not prevent a next 
recession, but will make it less deep. 
 
 
6   THE FUTURE OF MACRO-PRUDENTIAL 
     SUPERVISION 
 
The major argument of this paper is that there has been a blind spot of 
banking supervision, because it has more and more be n oriented at 
supervision of individual banks. In spite of some early warnings, e.g. by the 
BIS (see eg. Borio, 2006a, 2006b) macro-prudential supervision has been 
neglected. As the major, if not only aim of supervision is to internalize 
externalities and repair market failures, the focus of research that can provide 
help for macro-prudential supervision in the design of new measures to 
prevent another systemic crisis, should be directed a  finding out about these 
externalities which were at the root of the crisis.  
However, even now that various top economists are concerned with 
formalizing these externalities in new types of macro models, there is still 
insufficient knowledge on which externalities to internalize. That can also 
been seen as a valuable excuse for the failure of macro-prudential 
supervision: nobody, neither from academia nor from the practical 
profession, has been able to provide supervisors with reliable and credible 
knowledge on how to prevent a systemic failure. It seems that we still do not 
know. It is questionable whether more severe capital restrictions and 
provision of catbonds and coco’s, as described by Gelderman (this volume), 
will solve the whole problem and internalise all externalities. There are 
similar doubts with respect to the idea of living wills, which provide a 
recovery and solution to be used when a bank may get into problems (see 
Avgouleas et al., 2010). These living wills aim to resolve the moral hazard 
problem from banks that are too big to fail. However, it is not yet clear what 
kind of externalities are to be internalized by these new instruments and 
regulations. 
Obviously, in future, there should be more restrain in providing too risky 
credit at too low a price. Yet it seems impossible to return to the 1950‘s and 
1960’s when during dr. Holtrop’s presidency of the Dutch central bank, 
unilateral credit restrictions were imposed in case of too high credit creation 
by the banks. These credit restrictions acted both as a way to avoid 
inflationary pressure and as an instrument to stabilize the economy (see Fase 
and Den Butter, 1977). Evidently such restrictions are, in today’s perspective, 
too binding and do not reckon with the diverse positi ns of banks in the 
system. 
In spite of the fact that knowledge on the true nature of the externalities is 
still lacking, some preliminary conclusions on the future of supervision can 
be drawn from the arguments of this paper. These are: 
1. Initial shocks cannot be predicted and prevented: so direct attention to 
propagation mechanisms. 
2. Avoid contagion, e.g by the use of financial innovations which only 
seemingly enhance productivity and macro-economic welfare.  
3. Make securitization transparent and be based on standards (no over the 
counter trade) and oblige originators to keep part of heir securitized 
assets (see Fender and Mitchell, 2009); avoid resecuritization. 
4. Design the corporate governance structure of financial institutions in 
such a way that the moral hazard of a bailout is mitigated. 
 
It is obvious that macro-prudential supervision should focus much more 
than before on internalizing the external effects of today’s and tomorrow’s 
activities of the financial sector. In order for such regulation to be efficient, 
without unnecessary or even counterproductive rules, it is essential to avail of 
a model based analysis which identifies and quantifies the various 
mechanisms at work in the financial markets. That analysis will provide 
insights in the relative importance of the externalities and related risks, and it 
will yield indicators for supervisors to benchmark target values. It may also 
show how institutional changes can mitigate the contagion and correlation of 
risks in the present context of bounded rational behaviour. Such supervision 
will surely bring about rules and regulations which, on the short run, are 
binding, both for individual financial institutions as for the sector as a whole. 
However, on the long run, it will make the system more stable and therefore 
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